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Is populism necessary to the articulation of counter-hegemonic projects, as Laclau has long 
argued? Or is it, as Zizek maintains, a dangerous strategy, which inevitably degenerates into 
ideological mystification and reactionary postures? In this paper, I address this question through 
exploring the politics of discourse in Evo Morales’s Bolivia. While, in the years leading to the 
election of Morales, a populist ideological strategy was key to challenging neoliberal forces, once 
the hegemony of the new power bloc was stabilised, indigenous demands for emancipatory 
socio-environmental change began to be perceived as a threat to resource-based accumulation. 
In this context, the populist ‘signifiers’ originated in popular-indigenous struggles were used by 
the Morales government to legitimise repression of the indigenous movement. I argue, therefore, 
that ideological degeneration signals a problem not with populism per se, but rather with the class 
projects and shifting correlations of forces that underpin it in changing conjunctures.  
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1 Introduction    
The political cycle of progressive governments in Latin America has arguably come to an 
end (Modonesi, 2015). In a conjuncture characterised by the return of the right throughout 
the region, a critical evaluation of the achievements and shortcomings of progressive 
governments is both timely and necessary. In this paper, I contribute to this task through 
appraising the role played by official discourse in the context of the construction, 
maintenance and crisis of the left’s hegemony. Specifically, I aim to shed light on the 
tension-fraught relationship between the radical discursive strategy of the left and its 
ambiguous policy orientations, particularly as regards resource-based development.  
Bolivia under Evo Morales (2006-) is perhaps the best case to explore this tension. On the 
one hand, the Morales administration’s adoption of anti-imperialist, indigenous-inspired 
and radical-environmentalist discourse was one of the most innovative and politically 
promising features of the ‘post-neoliberal’ turn (Zimmerer, 2015). On the other, however, 
emphasis on indigenous and ‘red-green’ language is clearly in contradiction with the 
growing dependency on natural resource extraction and the repression of social forces that 
oppose it (Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011). We should neither ignore this 
contradiction nor dismiss it as mere hypocrisy or political betrayal; rather, we should 
carefully analyse and unpack the ways that discourse has been mobilised in an effort to 
maintain political legitimacy around resource-based development.   
To this end, I draw on a critical approach to resource governance, informed by regulation 
theory (Bridge and Perreault, 2009). This approach focuses on the institutional 
(re)configurations that work to stabilise (or ‘regularise’) accumulation in the face of 
contradictions and conflicts (Himley, 2013). ‘Institutions’ is meant here in a broad sense, 
including not just legal frameworks but also social relations and cultural norms in which the 
economy is embedded—a meaning close to what regulationists call the ‘mode of regulation’ 
(Bridge, 2000). Discourse is a central and perhaps underemphasised aspect of such 
institutional configurations (Bridge and McManus, 2000). There is, of course, a broad 
geographical literature dealing with the discursive ‘moment’ in environmental governance 
(e.g., Feindt and Oels, 2005). However, the role of discourse in regularising resource 
extraction—or more precisely, ‘resource-based accumulation’1—has been less emphasised. 
The ‘return of the state’ associated with ‘post-neoliberalism’ (Yates and Bakker, 2014), 
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moreover, pushes us to move beyond the focus on corporate initiatives which has 
characterised the literature on environmental neoliberalisation  and consider more explicitly 
the role and significance of official narratives and discursive strategies.  
Dealing with official discourse in the context of the Latin American left makes it almost 
inevitable to confront the issue of ‘populism’ (Madrid, 2008; Svampa, 2015b). The term 
‘populism’ is often deployed with a pejorative connotation; detractors of progressive 
governments in the region, for instance, have typically used it to denounce the ostensibly 
irrational and anti-democratic postures of left-nationalist leaders such as Chávez and 
Morales (Panizza and Miorelli, 2009, pp. 39–40). Against this tendency, I draw here on the 
work of the late Ernesto Laclau.  
Besides being the most influential (and perhaps controversial) theorist on the topic, Laclau 
(1977, 2005a) has the merit to have ‘redeemed’ populism, both politically and theoretically, 
from its negative associations. He brought the concept in close dialogue with a Gramscian 
understanding of hegemonic strategy, and consequently emphasised populism’s potential as 
a radically transformative political strategy. Some commentators have deployed Laclau’s 
ideas in analyses of the political projects of the Latin American left (Errejón and Guijarro, 
2016; Svampa, 2015b). However, there have not been attempts to bring a Laclauian 
understanding of populism in dialogue with literatures on resource governance, in order to 
tease out the discursive moment in the regularisation of resource-based development. 
In this paper, I undertake an analysis of the ideological positioning of Evo Morales’s MAS 
(Movement towards Socialism) party vis-à-vis resource-based development in Bolivia, 
against the background of changing political economic conditions and shifting correlations 
of forces. I address two specific objectives: 1) to explore how the discursive strategy of the 
Bolivian government has related to the stabilisation of resource-based accumulation in the 
face of antagonistic social forces; and 2) to understand how such a strategy changed in 
relation to different ‘threats’ to the Morales government’s hegemony, including opposition 
to extraction coming from the country’s indigenous movement. From this empirical 
exploration, I will derive conceptual insights into our understanding of populism and its 
relevance for the critical analysis of resource governance. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briefly discuss Laclau’s theory of 
populism and some of the critiques of it by radical scholars. I argue that Laclau’s 
conceptualisation offers a promising tool for the analysis of hegemonic strategy, provided 
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that the class relations and projects that underpin populism are brought to the fore. In 
Sections 3 and 4, I present the empirical arguments of the paper. First, I argue that 
populism—as a way of constructing a popular identity, through articulating social demands 
in opposition to a common ‘enemy’—was effective in challenging the hegemony of 
neoliberal forces in Bolivia and favouring their replacement with a new, ‘indigenous-
popular’ power bloc. Second, I show that, nevertheless, when indigenous demands that 
were central to this counter-hegemonic articulation—notably, ambitions to mobilise 
resource wealth for the promotion of ‘plurinationaliy’—became impossible to meet, the 
same discursive strategy was used by the government to legitimise its control over and 
repression of the indigenous movement. In Section 5, before concluding, I discuss the 
relevance of these arguments for our understanding of populism and for critical research 
on resource governance. 
This paper is part of a broader research project on the governance of natural resource 
extraction in Bolivia, for which I have conducted 12 months of fieldwork in the country 
between 2013 and 2014. The arguments presented in this paper are based primarily on the 
analysis of official discourse—particularly the writings of Bolivian vice president (2006-) 
and well-known Marxist intellectual, Álvaro García-Linera (Baker, 2015). García-Linera is 
arguably the main ideologist of the MAS (Movement towards Socialism) party. Over the 
last 15 years, he has produced a number of essays, editorials and pamphlets that have 
sought to provide both theoretical grounding and justification for the policy choices of the 
Morales administration. This analysis is complemented by reliance on secondary literature 
on hegemonic struggles and the political economy of natural resources in contemporary 
Bolivia, as well as on 51 semi-structured interviews with Bolivian-based policy analysts, 
extractive sector representatives, former and current government members and social 
movements’ spokespersons, on the relationship between the state and social forces vis-à-vis 
resource politics. 
2 Populism, discourse and social struggle  
Over the last four decades, Ernesto Laclau has made the greatest effort to recover the 
notion of populism from its marginal position in social theory. Such a marginalisation is 
due to both widespread ethical condemnation of populism and to its analytical ambiguity. 
The former, for Laclau (2005b, p. 19) is a symptom of the liberal association of politics 
with techno-managerial rationalism; the denigration of populism, in this sense, mirrors the 
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liberal denigration of ‘the people’ itself. The latter problem—the conceptual ambiguity of 
populism—is due to the fact that scholars have looked for a defining feature of populism 
in specific ideologies, political practices or historical circumstances (Laclau, 1977; Panizza, 
2005). Populism, however, for Laclau, is neither a political programme nor an ideology, but 
a strategy that is equally available to social forces of all political colours. Therefore, it should 
not be defined on the basis of specific empirical features; but rather, as he puts it, in a 
“strictly formal” way, as a logic of articulation of political contents (Laclau, 2005b, p. 44). 
In Laclau’s analysis, the starting point of populism is the presence of social demands that 
an existing institutional system is unable to meet. If demands are satisfied, they remain 
unrelated and social discontent is easily absorbed by the administrative apparatus (Laclau, 
2005a, p. 78). When the demands of multiple social groups go unmet, however, solidarity 
can arise among them: demands cease to be circumscribed to their ‘differential’ nature and 
begin to share a common source of frustration, a ‘negative’ dimension. Such a common 
source of frustration is the basis for the formation of a chain of equivalence among diverse 
demands.  
A central feature of populism is the creation, through equivalential chains among frustrated 
demands, of a collective identity—‘the people’—defined in opposition to a common 
enemy, as the common source of ‘negativity’. As Laclau puts it, therefore, “there is no 
populism without discursive construction of an enemy” (Laclau, 2005b, p. 39). The enemy, 
in other words, functions as constitutive outside—“a threatening heterogeneity against which 
the identity is formed” (Panizza, 2005, p. 17).  
‘The people’ is constructed through the extension of the chain of equivalence among ever 
more diverse demands; as the chain of equivalence extends, some demands cease to 
represent their specific contents, and become symbols for the totality of revendications in 
the chain. These signifiers, for Laclau, tend therefore to be empty: in order to be able to 
represent the totality of equivalences, they lose their relationship with the contents of 
specific demands (Laclau, 2005b, p. 40). Through this operation, a populist articulation is 
constituted which allows social groups to transcend the particularistic character of 
demands, and to create a counter-hegemonic bloc that identifies around shared signifiers 
and in an antagonistic relation to a common source of frustration.   
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2.1 Is populism post-political?   
Laclau’s politico-theoretical defence of populism has encountered strong criticisms from 
many on the radical left. Slavoj Žižek has perhaps been its most vocal opponent. In an 
intervention in the journal Critical Inquiry, Žižek (2006) argued contra Laclau that, while the 
left today is clearly failing to inspire transformative popular mobilisation, it should 
nonetheless avoid the temptation to emulate right-wing movements in their ‘populist’ 
postures. For Žižek (2006, p. 567), as a political strategy, populism is inadequate for 
achieving radical transformation: it is not an active construction of a genuine alternative, but 
a passive reaction to the threat of an enemy or ‘intruder’ (such as immigrants or 
bureaucrats). In this sense, he argues, populism contains an element of “ideological 
mystification” and thus “harbors in the last instance a long-term protofascist tendency” 
(Žižek, 2006, p. 557).  
Moreover, while appearing as a critique of ‘post-politics’—as in the case of right-wing 
rejection of European Union technocratic rule—populism is, for Žižek, its necessary 
complement: it reinforces the post-political consensus by presenting an irrational, purely 
reactive alternative to it (cf. Žižek, 2009, p. 61). Populist political projects are themselves, 
ultimately, post-political, for two reasons. First, because, by attributing social ills to an 
external enemy, populists renounce replacing the system itself: “for a populist, the cause of 
the troubles is ultimately never the system as such but the intruder who corrupted it” 
(Žižek, 2006, p. 555). Second, because the elementary unit of populist articulation is that of 
a social demand, and because every demand addresses an Other—an institutional system 
which is supposedly able to meet it—populist politics ends up reinforcing the inevitability 
of an elite. By contrast, “the revolutionary subject no longer operates at the level of 
demanding something from those in power; he wants to destroy them” (Žižek, 2006, p. 
558).   
I argue that these critiques, more recently taken up by Swyngedouw (2010), are partly 
misplaced. First, Laclau (2005a, p. 45) defines populism as the opposite of the post-political 
(or what he calls ‘institutionalist discourse’). It is true that demands are the basic unit of 
analysis of populism, and that these demands are addressed to an institutional system that 
acts as an Other (the elite, those in power). Populism, however, has the potential to subvert 
this order, through an accumulation of unmet demands that gives rise to the creation of an 
internal frontier whereby ‘the establishment’ itself is depicted as an enemy. Second, 
regarding populism’s supposed proto-fascist tendency, again this may be ungenerous. It is 
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inevitable that a hegemonic articulation be based on an ideological strategy, but the level of 
‘mystification’ in this strategy depends, once again, on historically specific material and 
political circumstances.   
2.2 Populism or class struggle? Yes, please! 
A second line of criticism, advanced primarily by Gramscian scholars, focuses precisely on 
the reduction of hegemony to a purely discursive-rhetorical struggle (Loftus, 2014). 
Laclau’s positions on populism briefly exposed above are the culmination of a long 
trajectory of work, begun in the 1980s, in which the theorist (partly in collaboration with 
Chantal Mouffe), sought to rethink the ontological bases of politics along ‘post-Marxist’ 
lines. Laclau and Mouffe (2001) famously presented this as an attempt to do away with the 
“last redoubt of economism” and class reductionism in Marxist theory. They redefine a 
theory of hegemony as an articulatory practice based on discourse, whereby social relations 
are formed within the articulation process itself and do not precede it (2001, pp. 105–114). 
In his recent work on populism, Laclau (2005b, p. 39) adopts this discursive approach, 
defining hegemony as the process of the elevation of particular demands to symbols (or 
signifiers) of the totality of social claims. The result is the displacement of class from the 
centre of both social analysis and radical politics (Žižek, 2000). For Jessop (2014), in an 
effort to liquidate economism, Laclau and Mouffe fall back into idealism, by excluding any 
reference to the play of material forces.  
Against the ‘postmodern’ Laclau, therefore, I suggest to draw insights from his early work, 
in which the discursive moment of populism is still clearly theorised in relation to class 
struggle (Hart, 2013, p. 304). In the essay ‘Towards a theory of populism’ (1977), Laclau 
starts from the consideration that, in order to transcend economic-corporate demands and 
begin to struggle for hegemony, a dominated class needs to engage in the political-
ideological sphere. In doing so, however, it cannot simply rely on class-based discourse; it 
needs to interpellate members of other classes and fractions through engaging on the class-
neutral terrain of ‘popular-democratic’ struggles (what Gramsci calls the ‘national-popular’) 
and through mobilising non-class referents such as ‘the people’ or ‘national interest’ 
(Laclau, 1977, p. 161). A hegemonic struggle is understood here as a struggle for 
articulation that takes place between antagonistic class projects, through mobilising non-
class interpellations. It is in this non-class discourse that a ‘strictly populist’ element should 
be located: “populism starts at the point where popular-democratic elements are presented 
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as an antagonistic option against the ideology of the dominant bloc” (Laclau, 1977, p. 173). 
Populism is defined therefore as a popular articulation that places ‘the people’ at the centre 
of discourse, pitted in opposition to a dominant ideology.  
This strategy—the appeal to the people against a dominant ideology—is of course available 
to dominant classes or fractions as much as to dominated ones. This is why, for Laclau, the 
label ‘populist’ has been applied to projects as politically diverse as Nazism, Peronism or 
Maoism. The important analytical point here is the following: populism is neither above 
class, nor stems directly from it; it consists of popular-democratic interpellations and 
antagonism towards dominant ideology, both articulated with specific political and class 
projects (Laclau, 1977, p. 175). This is not substantially different from Laclau’s most recent 
definition of populism as a logic of articulation through equivalential chains. But it is clearly 
more explicit about its class contents and, as such, much closer to a Gramscian 
understanding of hegemony. Considering the politico-ideological moment in the 
articulation of hegemonic projects in the context of changing correlations of forces is the 
starting point for analysing the relationship between populism and resource regularisation 
in Bolivia, to which I now turn.  
3 Constructing indigenous-popular hegemony  
3.1 Indigeneity and ‘gas for the people’ 
In Bolivia, the years between 2000 and 2005 were characterised by multiple popular 
struggles against neoliberalism, which precipitated a government crisis and led to the rise of 
Evo Morales and the MAS (Movement towards Socialism) party—culminating in the 
electoral success of December 2005. In this conjuncture, distinct popular sectors put 
forward political demands for change; not just established unions such as miners and 
campesinos,2 but also indigenous organisations, coca-growers and urban migrants (Postero, 
2010). The MAS party, created in the mid-1990s as a ‘political instrument’ of the 
campesino and coca-grower unions, began to function as a representative for indigenous-
campesino and leftist sectors and quickly extended its support at the national level.  
A populist strategy was central to the MAS’s articulating function (Errejón, 2014; Madrid, 
2008). Due to the nature of demands and the social groups that advanced them in this 
conjuncture, the constitution of a collective identity assumed two defining features. First, a 
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centrality of indigeneity as a marker of shared subalternity and oppression—due to the 
colonial history of Bolivia and the continued reproduction of unequal race relations until 
neoliberal times. The identification of a multiplicity of social sectors as ‘indigenous’ gave a 
clear anti-colonial twist to the discursive articulation of ‘the people’ and created an 
‘indigenous-popular’ collective identity as the base of the MAS-led counter-hegemonic 
strategy (Errejón, 2014; Postero, 2010). This resulted from a process of reclaiming and 
politicising indigeneity as an emancipatory category, begun in the 1970s with radical 
indianismo (García-Linera et al., 2010). Evo Morales, the figure of a leader who was both a 
subaltern and an indigenous—the leader of the coca-grower union movement of humble 
Aymara origin—came to personify this left-indigenous confluence, consciously emphasised 
in the MAS’s strategy.  
Second, the slogan ‘gas for the people’ came to condense all material demands around the 
perceived dispossession of the Bolivian poor. Here gas is both the main strategic 
commodity (Spronk and Webber, 2007) and a symbol of natural resource dispossession 
(Perreault, 2006). The October Agenda, emerging out of the ‘Gas War’ against the 
presidency of Sánchez de Lozada in 2003—the most intense point of anti-neoliberal 
struggle—rendered explicit this by demanding gas nationalisation alongside the president’s 
resignation and a new constitution.  
Multiple and partly conflicting desires and imaginaries were projected into the slogan ‘gas 
for the people’. For most of Bolivia’s popular sector it signified primarily greater national 
sovereignty and wealth redistribution (Kohl and Farthing, 2012); for the indigenous 
organisations in gas extraction areas, nationalisation was seen as an intermediate step 
towards the promotion of local territorial autonomy with co-government of natural 
resources (Radhuber, 2012). What mattered at this stage, however, were not so much the 
differences between these demands as the equivalences among them, which formed the basis 
for the indigenous-popular counter-hegemonic articulation.  
3.2 Imperialism as the ‘constitutive outside’ 
The construction of ‘the people’ is inseparable from the discursive production of an 
enemy, functioning as the ‘constitutive outside’ of the populist articulation (Laclau, 2005a). 
Indigenous-popular identity and its project based primarily on the reassertion of natural 
resource sovereignty ‘for the people’ was defined in opposition to an external enemy—
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neoliberal elites—which had two main features. First, the conservative forces then in 
power were as much ‘colonial’ as they were neoliberal. Particularly in the case of the white 
and mestizo land-holding and business elites based in the Oriente—the lowland eastern 
regions—they explicitly mobilised racist imaginaries to sustain their vested interest in 
keeping the indigenous majority out of power and in poverty (Perreault and Green, 2013). 
Second, to the extent that neoliberals facilitated the privatisation and foreign control of 
hydrocarbons and other key natural resource industries, they were perceived as traitors, 
vendepatria—those who sell out the fatherland.  
The common trait between the two is, of course, imperialism: neoliberals were depicted as 
complicit local elites acting as agents of foreign (namely US) economic and political 
interests. For instance, a detonating factor of the 2003 Gas War—a cycle of protests 
demanding gas nationalisation, violently repressed by the government and ending in the 
resignation of then president Sánchez de Lozada—was a plan to export natural gas to the 
US via a Chilean port.3 Anti-imperialist sentiments and discourse were also central to the 
long struggle of the coca-grower unions in the Chapare region against the DEA’s coca 
eradication policies, led by Evo Morales since the late 1980s, from which the MAS 
emerged.  
Recovering control of natural resources, therefore, in popular struggles and imaginaries, 
overlapped with reasserting national sovereignty vis-a-vis foreign interests and transnational 
capital. At the same time, this implied rethinking the nation-state to enable the inclusion of 
traditionally marginalised subaltern classes of indigenous origin (in a ‘plurinational’ 
configuration). Both these axes of ‘enmity’—political-economic and socio-cultural—
coalesced against the imperialist right.   
The right, in this conjuncture, was not simply a ‘spectre’ evocated by a manipulative leader 
to win mass support. Throughout Morales’s first term (2006-2009), the administration 
faced aggressive opposition on the part of national conservative elites just displaced from 
power, which brought the country on the brink of civil war. Opposition was spearheaded 
by the land-holding elites based in the region (departamento) of Santa Cruz, in the eastern 
lowlands—the country’s main agribusiness and cattle-ranching region. The right created a 
populist articulation of its own, combining reactionary politics with imaginaries of racial 
and class superiority (Peña-Claros, 2010). Despite widespread popular support for the 
Morales government, this resulted in a tense political conflict between the MAS and the 
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conservative bloc—a ‘catastrophic deadlock’ (García-Linera, 2010) which reached its most 
intense point in 2008. 
3.3 ‘Point of bifurcation’ and ‘creative tensions’ 
The conflict with the conservative bloc was recomposed in 2008-’09. In August 2008, the 
MAS won a referendum demanded by the right to revoke Morales’s presidency. The 
conservatives in the east shifted then to a more violent approach, staging a failed ‘civic 
coup’ attempt and mobilising paramilitary violence, which caused strong popular reaction 
and widespread international condemnation. Electoral and political victory was, however, 
insufficient. During the process which led to the approval of a new constitution in early 
2009, political negotiations between the MAS and the opposition were decisive in 
overcoming the conservatives’ resistance (Schavelzon, 2012). These negotiations implied 
limiting the transformative reach of the Constitution in key aspects—especially land 
reform—but guaranteed that the right went along with MAS’s Process of Change.  
The end of the antagonism of the conservative bloc consolidated the political position of 
the Morales government, sanctioned by a landslide victory in the 2009 elections. For 
García-Linera (2010), this was the moment in which the MAS consolidated its ‘hegemonic’ 
position: even if a few recalcitrant elements remained, the MAS—with the support of 
popular and progressive sectors in the streets and ballots—had won the decisive political 
battle.  
In the vice president’s own analysis (García-Linera, 2010, pp. 40–46), control of the state 
on the part of the new ‘power bloc’ was obtained through securing support along three 
main axes: a monopoly on the coercive apparatus; control over the economic-productive 
sphere (enabled by the partial nationalisation of hydrocarbons); and the imposition of a 
new discourse, centred on issues such as decolonisation, pluralism and the ‘productive 
state’. This led, after 2008, to a ‘point of bifurcation’—or moment of stabilization after the 
crisis—in which the authority of the Morales government was fully re-established (García-
Linera, 2010).  
At this point, for García-Linera, the only tensions that remained were within the popular 
base of the government. These were necessary, ‘creative’ tensions, which did not question 
the model of society or the political economic horizon of the Process of Change (García-
Linera, 2011a). None of these tensions, therefore—regarding state-society relations, class 
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antagonisms and the contradiction between resource extractivism and ‘vivir bien’ (‘living 
well’)—represented a threat to the hegemony of the MAS (Webber, 2015a). Rather, 
according to García-Linera (2011a, p. 72 original emphasis), “they are vivifying and 
dialectical contradictions of our Process of Change, productive forces of the revolution whose 
existence and democratic treatment will allow us to advance”.4  
Other accounts from Evo Morales’s first years in power share—perhaps understandably in 
this conjuncture—an optimistic view of necessary but productive tensions (Postero, 2010). 
Yet, the ‘end-of-history’ tale told by Bolivia’s vice president is not fully convincing. I argue, 
on the contrary, that it was precisely in the moment that neoliberal elites were incorporated 
in the MAS’s project that the indigenous-popular articulation began irreversibly to crack 
(Webber, 2015b). 
4 Legitimising repression   
As a renowned Bolivian intellectual, close to the MAS government, explained: “it remains 
to be seen to what extent we can still read Álvaro [García-Linera] as a theorist. He is—and 
he would say this himself—a propagandist. That is his task” (author interview, La Paz, 3 
March 2014).  
That García-Linera’s account is not innocent is clear from his curious inversion of 
priorities in discussing Bolivia’s tensions. While dismissing arguably fundamental class and 
ecological contradictions as unimportant, he identifies as the only potentially dangerous 
tension what he calls a resurgence of ‘corporatism’—the presence of sectorial demands on 
the part of popular sectors that pit them against the government (2011a, pp. 47–48):  
If the corporatist and unionist particularism triumphs in the acting of the people, this 
will mark the beginning of a degenerative process of the revolution, which will be the 
starting point for the conservative restoration led by the entrepreneurial bloc.  
What this concern disguises, however, is the discursive targeting of indigenous groups 
critical of the government, accused of putting their ‘corporatist’ interests before the 
universality of the Process of Change (Webber, 2015a). The main example of corporatism 
cited by García-Linera is that of lowland indigenous organisations’ demands for territorial 
autonomy. This first, somewhat veiled, attack on the indigenous movement signalled, I 
claim, the beginning of the end of the MAS-led indigenous-popular hegemony.  
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4.1 Cracks in the MAS’s hegemony  
García-Linera, as well as sympathetic commentators (Errejón and Guijarro, 2016), argued 
that the MAS’s ability to win the support of popular classes and ‘patriotic’ capitalists alike 
was key to its hegemonic consolidation. The vice president recognised the risk of 
weakening in this way ‘hegemony’ through overextending its reach—that is, by including 
capitalist interests that cannot be kept under indigenous-popular leadership (such as those 
of landed oligarchies and transnational extractive firms)—but considered this an inevitable 
aspect of constructing hegemony (García-Linera, 2011a, pp. 40–41):  
Only debate, tensions and continuous rectifications between the firm leadership of the 
revolutionary social nucleus and the amplitude of the [hegemonic articulation] can 
unfold this necessary contradiction and canalise it as a driving force of the 
revolutionary dynamic.  
Securing political stability through adjusting to dominant interests, however, is far from a 
Gramscian understanding of ‘expansive’ hegemony—and much closer to what the 
Sardinian called ‘passive revolution’ (Jessop, 1990, p. 212). A passive revolution need not 
be politically conservative in character—and in the case of the Morales government, in 
many respects it was not (for instance, it resulted in increased levels of wealth redistribution 
and greater access to political representation for traditionally marginalised groups). 
Nevertheless, it ultimately resulted in moderate reform and, importantly, a deepened 
dependence on conservative interests (Hesketh and Morton, 2014; Webber, 2015b). 
First, as the MAS government renounced broader changes, it deepened its dependency on 
resource exports (Andreucci, 2017). The production and export of minerals and 
hydrocarbons had begun to increase already before the election of Evo Morales, 
incentivised by high commodity prices (figure 1). Particularly from Morales’s second term, 
however, the new administration actively promoted such an increase and aligned itself with 
extractive firms’ demands to sidestep or revert indigenous and environmental rights that 
could potentially threaten it (Andreucci and Radhuber, 2015). This relates to another 
‘creative tension’ underplayed by García-Linera: the contradiction between extractivism and 
‘vivir bien’—defined by the vice president as “the satisfaction of material human needs 
through a vivifying dialogue with nature” (2011a, p. 71). García-Linera sees this as a 
temporary tension that the government is in the process of recomposing in its path 
towards constructing “communitarian socialism”. Unfortunately, however, there is no 
evidence that such a path exists.   
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Figure 1. Total value of exports by sector, in million US$. Source: Own elaboration based on data from the National Institute of Statistics, 
Bolivia, 2015. 
 
Second, relatedly, by renouncing more comprehensive reform, the MAS effectively 
excluded demands that were key to the indigenous-popular articulation described above—
especially indigenous projects in the direction of territorial sovereignty and 
‘plurinationality’. Overcoming the conflict with the conservative bloc, in this sense, implied 
the creation of another antagonism, perhaps more dangerous to the extent that it created a 
caesura within ‘the people’ itself.  
4.2 The demise of plurinationality 
The conflict in 2011-2012 over a highway cutting through the Isiboro-Sécure Natural Park 
and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS) inaugurated a conjuncture of open tension between the 
government and the Bolivian indigenous movement (McNeish, 2013). The conflict resulted 
in a crisis of the indigenous-popular articulation on which the MAS based its hegemonic 
strategy (Postero, 2015). Most notably, it led to the break-up of the Pacto de Unidad—the 
indigenous-campesino ‘Unity Pact’—and its reconstitution as a government-controlled 
umbrella organisation.  
This formal alliance between the two main rural movements—the campesino unions and 
indigenous-originario organisations—was established in 2004 and represented the main 
channel through which indigenous-campesino political proposals were formulated. The 
main contribution of the Unity Pact was the ‘plurinational state’ proposal (Garcés, 2010)—
an attempt to articulate principles of indigenous territorial autonomy and economic and 










































































were included in the 2009 Constitution, which redefined Bolivia as a plurinational state 
founded on anti-colonial struggles. 
The consolidation of the MAS’s ‘hegemony’ through its political compromise with the 
conservative bloc created increasing tensions within the Unity Pact. Internal divergences 
had long existed, of course. For instance, campesino unions’ demands placed emphasis on 
access to individually owned land for market-oriented production, while indigenous 
organisations stressed territorial self-government and had a more ambivalent relationship 
with market forces and ‘development’ (McNeish, 2013). The process of indigenous-popular 
articulation against neoliberalism and of resistance against a conservative comeback had 
allowed these groups to place emphasis on their commonalities (or ‘equivalences’) rather 
than differences.  
In this conjuncture, however, such differences resurfaced, for two main reasons. First, 
although the MAS had made it its official goal to use revenues from gas ‘nationalisation’ to 
promote communitarian forms of political and economic organisation (Gobierno de 
Bolivia, 2007), it became clear that its policies were promoting economic ‘primarisation’ 
rather that plurality. Second, in the process that led to the approval of a new constitution in 
2009, ambitions of creating a plurinational state were significantly ‘domesticated’ (Garcés, 
2011; Postero, 2015). An important moment in this sense was the parliamentary 
negotiations between the MAS and the opposition over several aspects of the constitutional 
text approved in 2007 by the Constituent Assembly (in turn based on the Unity Pact’s 
proposal). Such negotiations altered the original text substantially, reducing legal 
mechanisms for indigenous representation and self-government (Garcés, 2010, pp. 28–29). 
Most importantly, perhaps, ceding to the demands of the right, the MAS renounced its 
plans for reducing land concentration and promoting its redistribution.  
According to Fernando Garcés, who oversaw the formulation of the Unity Pact’s proposal, 
this marked a moment of rupture in the relationship between the MAS and the indigenous 
movement:  
In the October 2008 parliamentary negotiations, the [relationship] broke. This was for 
me the first major setback of the Process. And in the worst old style, no? Locked 
behind closed doors … the MAS with the other three [opposition parties] negotiated 
one hundred articles while we danced celebrating the Constitution, which was being 
manipulated in the congress in the worst of ways (author interview, Cochabamba, 20 
October 2014).     
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The indigenous movement grew increasingly discontented, and found itself directly 
opposed to campesino unions, which remained loyal to the government.   
During the TIPNIS conflict, such tensions exploded and the indigenous-campesino alliance 
broke down. Though these tensions were partly related to identitarian hostilities (Fontana, 
2014), they were also and primarily caused by divergent and increasingly incompatible 
political projects. An important consequence of such tensions is that they rendered it 
problematic for all rural movements to share the label of ‘indigenous’. Indigeneity, in other 
words, ceased to function as a signifier around which a collective identity coalesced. For 
instance, in the 2012 Census, indigenous self-identification—which had reached 62% of 
the Bolivian population over 15 years of age in 2001—dropped to 41%. While the results 
are partially attributed to a change in the survey question—now asking to indicate a specific 
ethnic affiliation—the drop can also be interpreted as a reversal of what had been a 
politicisation of indigeneity as a marker of subalternity (Schavelzon, 2014). The repression 
suffered by the indigenous movement and its supporters during and after the TIPNIS 
dispute marked an end to the ‘indigenous’ character of the popular articulation.  
4.3 Spectres of imperialism 
The way that the MAS’s policies and postures exacerbated the tension between the 
campesino and indigenous blocs shows that what García-Linera called a ‘resurgence of 
corporatism’ was arguably a legitimate response to the exclusion of indigenous political 
demands from the strategy of the power bloc, in turn a consequence of the conservative 
turn of the MAS. Not only was the indigenous movement’s opposition to extractivist 
expansion perceived by the government as a threat to its accumulation strategy; indigenous 
repression also clearly contradicted the overall discursive strategy of the MAS as an 
indigenous-popular government promoting vivir bien.  
The aggressiveness with which the indigenous movement was treated, with episodes of 
brutality unusual for the Morales government—as in the case of the violent expulsion of 
members of the highland indigenous federation CONAMAQ (National Council of Allyus 
and Markas of the Qullasuyu) from their headquarters in late 2013—may seem unnecessary 
and paradoxical. Indeed, the necessity to expand export-oriented resource extraction put 
the MAS in the uneasy position. How could it remove the threat coming from indigenous 
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organisations, while at the same time maintaining an indigenous-informed discourse, 
however diluted, as the basis of its ideological strategy?  
The solution, I claim, could only be the disappearance of anti-government indigenous 
organisations. This is what the MAS set out to do, since 2011, in two main ways. First, it 
divided and disarticulated the main indigenous organisations, in order to control them. 
Commencing in 2012 with the lowland indigenous federation, CIDOB—Confederation of 
Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia—the government identified members and cadres aligned 
with the party, or willing to be co-opted. It created parallel organisations under control of 
the MAS and isolated and marginalised the remaining—that is, legitimately elected—
leadership and members. This formed a split between pro-government (MASista) and 
independent (organico) organisations. A similar pattern was followed in late 2013 with the 
above-mentioned CONAMAQ. This allowed for the formal reconstitution of the Unity 
Pact, this time fully controlled by the government. The MAS could thus continue claiming 
that it was, after all, the political expression of indigenous interests.  
Second, the government discursively targeted as ‘enemies of the Process of Change’   
members and supporters of the independent CIDOB and CONAMAQ. These refused to 
be corrupted into submission and were attempting to reorganise, attracting the sympathy of 
leftist intellectuals and activists critical of the MAS (as well as, it must be said, of 
conservative parties and sectors of society, willing to exploit this tension against Morales). 
Once again, García-Linera led the charge. In a booklet published in 2012, titled Geopolítica 
de la Amazonía—“Geopolitics of the Amazon”—the vice president argued that the 
indigenous organisations opposing the expansion of extractive frontiers were manipulated 
by international NGOs, in turn aligned with national landed capital and imperialist 
interests, with the goal of weakening the Bolivian state’s presence in the region (Beaulieu 
and Postero, 2013).  
Another booklet, titled El ONGismo, enfermedad infantil del derechismo (García-Linera, 
2011b)—“NGOism, a right-wingers’ infantile disease”—attacked primarily a number of 
leftist intellectuals and former government members working in NGOs, critical of the 
MAS’s trajectory (see Almaraz et al., 2012). They were accused of sabotaging the 
government and aiding a conservative comeback: 
These critics, yesterday friends in the government, today resented and in the 
opposition, lie, manipulate and cheat regarding what happens with the Process of 
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Change. And in their endeavour, they adhere to the totality of falsities, lies and attacks 
of the neoliberal right, restorer of the old regime (García-Linera, 2011b, p. 166) 
In a later crackdown on NGOs in 2015, García-Linera drew an interesting historical 
parallel by referring to these pro-indigenous intellectuals as “green Trotskyists” (Mealla, 
2015).  Attacking indigenous organisations and their supporters was necessary to 
ideologically legitimising their repression. Those who could not be co-opted needed to be 
‘othered’—through depicting them as internal enemies.  
What is interesting to note here is that, even though US-friendly neoliberal elites were then 
much less of a real enemy—being politically disarticulated and in a relatively friendly 
relationship with government (Webber, 2015b)—they were still invoked as a threat, with 
the principal purpose of assimilating the indigenous movement to ‘imperialism’. The MAS 
could thus claim that the indigenous movement was firmly on board with the government’s 
project, and that only a deviant fraction of the indigenous organisations, misguided by 
agents of imperialism, kept criticising the Morales administration. Therefore, the overall 
populist strategy of the MAS—as representing the interests of an indigenous-popular 
majority, contra neoliberal and imperialist enemies—could be maintained. There was, 
however, a fundamental shift both in ‘the people’—no longer politically indigenous—and in 
the ‘constitutive outside’—the spectre of past enemies now replaced by new (and unlikely) 
‘agents of imperialism’.  
5 Resource regulation and populism   
The empirical arguments of this paper show that there is a link worth exploring between 
the type of political and ideological strategy that Laclau defines as ‘populism’ and the 
regularisation of resource-based accumulation. It is important to stress that, generally 
speaking, the relationship between an institutional reconfiguration and its stabilising effect 
on accumulation is neither necessary nor intentional (Jessop and Sum, 2006)—it would be 
absurd to claim that the Bolivian Process of Change was meant to stabilise extractivism all 
along. Nevertheless, it is evident that, in certain contexts, ideology plays a central role in 
building legitimacy around controversial accumulation strategies, thus contributing to their 
‘regularisation’.  
The Bolivian case makes this clear. A popular articulation created a collective indigenous-
popular identity that coalesced around the goal of reclaiming gas ‘for the people’. This was 
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an accumulation of popular struggles and demands—not a top-down strategy—which 
found in resource nationalisation and plurinationality signifiers around which to build a 
hegemonic articulation. This discursive articulation, however—based on popular demands 
and including a strong indigenous element—eventually turned against the indigenous 
movement itself. As mobilising gas resources was key to the MAS’s project, the indigenous 
that opposed extractivism were seeing as sabotaging the Process of Change and therefore 
repressed. Paradoxically, therefore, a discursive articulation that formed the basis of a 
counter-hegemonic strategy—centred on reforming natural resource governance—ended 
up being deployed as a way to stabilise resource extraction and arrangements around it, 
through justifying the repression of those who opposed it. 
Here, perhaps, we see why radical leftists like Žižek (2006) see in populism an element of 
ideological mystification. Laclau himself warns about the peril of discursive articulation 
degenerating into manipulative rhetoric. In the institutionalisation of the populist rupture, 
he argues, the equivalential discourse risks becoming the ‘langue de bois’ of the state.  When 
this happens, “the increasing distance between actual social demands and dominant 
equivalential discourse frequently leads to the repression of the former and the violent 
imposition of the latter” (Laclau, 2005b, p. 47). In other words, in the process of 
institutionalisation of a populist articulation, a signifier of equivalence, appropriated by 
state actors, can turn into a manipulative rhetoric that accompanies the repression of actual 
social demands.  
Should this lead us to conclude that populism is a necessarily ‘post-political’ strategy—one 
that, as Žižek has it, harbours in the last instance a ‘protofascist’ tendency? The populism 
of the Morales government after its institutionalisation phase looked indeed ‘post-political’, 
as it served to displace social antagonism and foreclose transformative possibilities. Laclau 
(1977, pp. 196–97) himself concedes that populism is frequently associated with this type 
of class mediation strategies and with passive revolution. However, as I hope I have 
demonstrated in the Bolivian case, the problem is not populism per se, but precisely the 
class project and political trajectory that is articulated and sustained through populism.  
First, I argue, what ultimately rendered the demands of the indigenous movement 
incompatible with the reproduction of the power bloc was the MAS’s conscious decision to 
leave the interests of key capitalist sectors untouched. To be sure, it is inevitable for a 
counter-hegemonic articulation (of which a populist strategy is the necessary ideological 
cement) to bring together diverse and potentially conflicting ambitions; and it is normal 
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that the process of institutionalisation may bring these tensions to the surface. Yet, I would 
insist that, by renouncing pushing the antagonism with the right further, the MAS reduced 
its room for manoeuvre for implementing reforms in the direction of plurinationality and 
away from extractivism (though its policy plans in this respect were experimental and 
admittedly ambiguous).  
For instance, some of the central indigenous demands around territorial autonomy and for 
a greater participation in resource governance would have certainly be more easily 
accommodated had the Morales administration undertaken more comprehensive agrarian 
and extractive sector reform, increasing its ability to redistribute land and allowing for 
greater democratic control of resource extraction and rents. This is, of course, easier said 
than done, and there is no guarantee that such reforms would have eliminated tensions 
within the indigenous-popular articulation. The point is, however, that the MAS 
government quite deliberately chose not follow this path and, by partly aligning itself with 
landed and extractive capital’s interests, it rendered the marginalisation of certain political 
projects (and the repression of the groups putting them forward) virtually inevitable.  
Therefore, once again the disarticulation of ‘the people’—and the repression of subaltern 
groups whose demands were deemed incompatible with the reproduction of the power 
bloc—was not the result of the populist strategy itself, but of the uneven and incomplete 
institutionalisation of demands resulting from the passive revolutionary ‘statization’ of a 
counter-hegemonic project (Jessop, 1990, p. 213).  
Moreover, in the Bolivian case, it is clear that the Morales government proactively intervened 
to break up the indigenous-popular articulation through co-optation and repression. In this 
sense, the Bolivian political theorist Luis Tapia—a former member of the pro-MAS 
intellectual collective ‘Comuna Group’ (Baker, 2015), now a vocal critic of the Morales 
government—contests García-Linera’s claim that, by including conservative elements in its 
‘Process of Change’, the MAS achieved any form of ‘expansive’ hegemony: 
I think that the process of political articulation carried out by the MAS is not 
hegemonic in a Gramscian sense, because [it is] a project of domination (dominación) 
and not of leadership (dirección). For Gramsci, to be the leader [of a hegemonic 
articulation], one must be ahead of the fragments that are articulated. Yet, the MAS 
has always been behind them. In this sense, it would rather resemble what Gramsci 
calls the “negative construction of hegemony”, that is to say, by way of destruction 
and disarticulation. […] Because what is clear is that it deployed repressive apparatuses 
and disorganised civil society. In fact the MAS is not a leader in civil society, it is a 
disorganising force of civil society (author interview, La Paz, 13 October 2014).     
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The active role played by the MAS in breaking up the indigenous-popular articulation 
makes it difficult to argue that such an articulation collapsed of its own accord under the 
strain of its internal tensions  
Another problematic aspect of populism is that, in order for a collective identity to hold, it 
needs to constantly reproduce the threat of an external or internal enemy. For Laclau’s 
critics, this is what makes populism a primarily reactive (and potentially reactionary) 
strategy prone to irrationality and authoritarianism. It is undeniable that the construction of 
‘the people’ is predicated on the existence of a ‘constitutive outside’ (in Laclau’s words, the 
common source of frustration for a chain of diverse but related demands and 
revendications). And it is clear that—as in the case of right-wing nationalism’s pitting ‘the 
people’ against immigrants, minorities and other ‘intruders’—this ideological strategy can 
indeed be reactionary. Yet, once again, the identification and ‘naming’ of such an enemy is 
a result of the political and class project that is being put forward, not simply of its 
ideological strategy.  
For a coalition of subaltern groups of indigenous origin, for instance—as in the Bolivian 
case—there was nothing irrational in identifying the country’s racist landed oligarchs as its 
main political antagonist. There is no doubt that the disappearance of a constitutive outside 
would have challenged the counter-hegemonic articulation and, at the very least, forced it 
to readjust its ideological strategy. The problem, however, is that the interests of landed 
and extractive capital were not defeated, but subsumed into the agenda of the new power 
bloc (had they been defeated, the disappearance of this ‘enemy’ would likely be considered 
as a political achievement rather than a problem). In this way, the ‘threat’ disappeared, but 
the class and political antagonism was not overcome. Rather, the MAS, through class 
mediation and transformist tactics, impeded the development of a more genuinely 
indigenous-popular hegemony and ideologically reframed indigenous ‘corporatism’ as the 
new ‘constitutive outside’ (associating it rhetorically to neoliberalism and imperialism).   
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, I aimed to shed light on the tension-fraught relationship between the radical 
ideological strategy of the Latin American left—understood as an instance of ‘populism’ in 
a Laclauian sense—and its less-than-radical policy orientations, particularly as regards 
resource-based development. Through the case of Bolivia, I explored how the populist 
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discursive strategy of the Morales government—characterised by a novel combination of 
left-nationalist, indigenous and radical-environmentalist themes—related to the goal of 
stabilising resource-based accumulation in the face of conservative reaction as well as social 
opposition ‘from below’. I found that populism—as a way of constructing a popular 
identity, through articulating social demands in opposition to a common ‘enemy’—was 
effective in challenging the hegemony of neoliberal forces and favouring their replacement 
with a new, ‘indigenous-popular’ power bloc. Nevertheless, when indigenous demands that 
constituted the popular articulation—notably, ambitions to mobilise resource wealth for 
the promotion of ‘plurinationality’—became impossible to meet, the same discursive 
strategy was used by the government to legitimise its control over and repression of the 
indigenous movement.  
I argued, therefore, that official discursive strategies, as part of a ‘mode of regulation’, can 
be mobilised to reduce social opposition to resource-based accumulation. In the case of 
Bolivia, this went from building on popular struggles and imaginaries in order to push 
through a progressive institutional restructuring of natural resource industries, to turning 
the same discursive articulation against sectors opposing the expansion of extractivism. In 
the latter case, populist discursive strategy degenerated into ideological manipulation, 
deployed to justify repression. This led me to side with Laclau—against some of his critics 
on the left—in defending the transformative potential of populism, and to argue that the 
degeneration of discourse observed in Latin American left governments signals a problem 
not with populism per se, but rather with the political and class projects that these 
governments put forward.  
The theoretical implication of these findings, I think, is clear: in order to understand the 
political nature of populism, one must get out of the sphere of discourse and ideology, and 
consider the class relations and shifting correlations of forces that underpin it. In the 
present conjuncture—characterised by the end of a political cycle and the aggressive 
comeback of the right—it is important, therefore, to resist the temptation to blame the 
left’s shortcomings on their populist strategies. Rather, we should focus on these 
governments’ problematic politics and the ways they turned, at least in part, against the 
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1 I use the phrase ‘resource-based accumulation’ to refer to the processes of generating, extracting and 
distributing value associated with natural resource exploitation. It is not strictly speaking a capital 
accumulation process, because much of the value is not generated in the production process (that is to say, it 
is not surplus value extracted from labour) but rather appropriated through rent relations. For this reason, 
resource-based accumulation generates dynamics of struggle that are primarily over value distribution—that is, 
over the appropriation and redistribution of resource rents (Andreucci et al., 2017). 
2 In Bolivia, the term ‘campesino’ refers mainly to Quechua and Aymara speaking rural populations in the 
Andean highlands (Perreault, 2008, n. 2). Politically, the campesino bloc includes the two main rural workers’ 
unions—the Unified Syndicalist Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB) and the National 
Federation of Peasant Women of Bolivia–‘Bartolina Sisa’ (CNMCIOB-BS)—as well as the Syndicalist 
Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia (CSCIB), representing peasant migrants in the 
lowlands (known originally as ‘colonizadores’ and, more recently, as ‘interculturales’), and the two main coca-
grower (cocalero) confederations in Cochabamba and the Yungas (COCA TROPICO and COFECAY). 
Campesinos may identify culturally or linguistically as ‘indigenous’, but politically this label is restricted to 
lowland groups pertaining to the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB). In this paper, I 
also use the term ‘indigenous’ to refer to the highland federation CONAMAQ (National Council of Allyus 
and Markas of the Qullasuyu). Although their members self-identify primarily as ‘originarios’, and the two 
organisations have different histories and objectives, CONAMAQ has been closely allied to CIDOB since 
2002 and can be considered to form part of the same political movement (Garcés, 2010).   
3 Resentment towards Chile went back to the 1879-1883 War of the Pacific, in which Bolivia lost access to 
the sea. 
4 All translations from the Spanish are my own.  
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